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ESSAY
WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN
ESSAY ON AGENT ORANGE AND CHOICE OF LAW
Aaron D. Twerski*
The Agent Orange choice of law decision' should never have
been written. That it had to be written was the fault of the Sec-
ond Circuit in ruling that jurisdiction based on federal common
law was inappropriate under the facts of the case.2 Judge Wein-
stein was faced with an impossible dilemma when the case was
remanded to the district court. He came to realize that the Sec-
ond Circuit had erred badly. The case demanded a federal rule
of decision; there was no rational way to litigate the case without
utilizing a federal standard. If federal common law would not
provide the rule of decision, then a common- law "federal" solu-
tion had to be fashioned.
Although the Agent Orange decision will undoubtedly cause
traditionalists considerable consternation, Judge Weinstein was
not in fact seeking to break new ground with his choice of law
decision in this case. He fashioned a "national consensus" stan-
dard as the appropriate governing law because his back was up
against the wall. I believe that he was forced to take this ap-
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Institute; B.S. 1970 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1965 Marquette University.
This article was written when the author was the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished
Professor of Law at Hofstra University.
Several subsections of this Article were taken from a memorandum prepared by the
author for the plaintiffs' Management Committee and incorporated in large part in the
Fairness Brief filed by the plaintiffs in support of the settlement. The author served as a
member of the Law Committee in the Agent Orange litigation. Many of the arguments
contained herein were a product of the joint efforts of the author and Irving Like, of
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I In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
2 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
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proach for three reasons: (1) no choice of law method presently
extant could provide a rational method for choosing law in this
case; (2) the spectre of treating soldiers differently based solely
on their differing domiciles was so grotesque that Judge Wein-
stein was unable to put aside the argument that unequal treat-
ment of similarly situated plaintiffs was unjust; and (3) the lo-
gistics of trying the case without a single "federal standard"
were mind-boggling. For all practical purposes, if the more tradi-
tional approaches were to be used, Agent Orange simply would
not have been justiciable.
As we shall see, these arguments have an interlocking qual-
ity, with one bolstering the internal logic of the other. Each one,
viewed individually, supports the rejection of traditional choice
of law norms. When taken together it becomes evident why
Judge Weinstein believed that he had no choice but to search
for an innovative alternative.
It remains to be seen whether Judge Weinstein's decision to
adopt a national consensus standard as the governing law of the
case was correct. It should be noted, however, that by aban-
doning the existing choice of law methodologies he was sailing
into uncharted waters. It will be unproductive to question
whether his Erie-Klaxon guess3 was accurate. Only an omnis-
cient G-d (or the United States Supreme Court) could answer
that question authoritatively.
I. A PAGE OF HISTORY
Before embarking on a critical evaluation of Judge Wein-
stein's landmark choice of law decision, it will be useful to re-
view the factual and procedural history of the case. For those
who lived with the case day to day for over five years, it is often
hard to imagine that not everyone in the universe has total fa-
miliarity with the Agent Orange story. However, a year's dis-
tance has effected some sobriety. I have come to realize that
other matters of importance did transpire during that period of
time and that the attention of some may have been diverted
from all of the procedural wrangling that took place.
The Agent Orange litigation began in early 1979 when sev-
eral individual veterans and their families commenced actions
3 See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
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against the United States and the chemical companies that sup-
plied the military with the herbicide "Agent Orange. '' This her-
bicide was used by the military to defoliate the jungles in Viet-
nam so that the Viet Cong could not hide and ambush American
and South Vietnamese troops. Barrels of the herbicide were
marked by the chemical companies with an orange stripe -
hence the name Agent Orange.
The complaint alleged that Agent Orange was contaminated
with the highly toxic by-product 2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
dioxin (TCDD or dioxin).5 The plaintiffs alleged causes of action
in negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, intentional tort
and nuisance. These causes of action were tied to each of the
three product liability categories: production defect, design de-
fect and failure to warn. According to the plaintiffs, the veter-
ans' exposure to the TCDD contaminated herbicides in Vietnam
resulted in a host of injuries, such as chloracne,G and various sys-
temic diseases including soft tissue sarcoma and prophyria
cutanea tarda.7 The plaintiffs also claimed that exposure re-
sulted in miscarriages to their wives and birth defects in their
children.8
A. Federal Common Law
In the early stages of the litigation, Judge Pratt ruled that
plaintiffs were correct in their contention that federal question
jurisdiction existed because the case implicated "federal com-
mon law."' In reviewing the leading cases, Judge Pratt deter-
mined that three factors had to be considered before a court
could find that an adequate foundation for jurisidiction based on
federal common law existed: "(1) the existence of a substantial
federal interest in the outcome of a litigation; (2) the effect on
this federal interest should state law be applied; and (3) the ef-
fect on state interests should state law be displaced by federal
' The full procedural history is related in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
597 F. Supp. 740, 750-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
5 Id. at 750.
6 Chloracne is a skin disease that can leave large permanent scars. Id. at 817.
" Soft tissue sarcoma is a form of cancer and porphyria cutanea tarda is a liver
ailment. Id.
3 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 750.
' In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737 (FD.N.Y. 1979).
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common law." 10 In determining the extent of the federal interest
in Agent Orange, Judge Pratt relied on United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co.," in which the Supreme Court stated that: "no re-
lation. between the Government and a citizen is more distinc-
tively federal in character than that between it and members of
its armed forces. 1 2 Thus, this relationship and any interference
with it must be governed by federal authority.13
The federal interest in the Agent Orange litigation, how-
ever, was not founded solely on the relationship between the
United States and its soldiers. It was tied to the relationship be-
tween the United States and its defense contractors as well. It
was clear that the potential liability of war contractors to
soldiers would affect future dealings between the government
and the contractors. The district court found the dual federal
interests in the litigation sufficient to satisfy the first factor of
jurisdiction based on federal common law.
After ruling on the existence of substantial federal interest,
Judge Pratt questioned whether those interests would be im-
paired if the appropriate state laws were applied to resolve the
issue of liability. He concluded that the application of fifty dif-
ferent state laws would result in similarly situated plaintiffs be-
ing treated in a disparate fashion.1 4 That soldiers who fought
shoulder to shoulder in Vietnam should be treated according to
the law of their individual domiciles would certainly burden the
interests of the federal government in affording even-handed
10 Id. at 746.
1 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
'2 Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301 (1947)).
is In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court stated that:
To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between
soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal
governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of
the relation between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally
derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority [citations omit-
ted]. So also we think are interferences with that relationship such as the facts
of this case involve. For, as the Federal Government has the exclusive power to
establish and define the relationship by virtue of its military and other powers,
[footnote omitted] equally clearly it has power in execution of the same func-
tions to protect the relation once formed from harms inflicted by others. ..
332 U.S. at 305-6.
14 Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 748.
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treatment to those who served their nation.15 Applying state law
would also burden the federal interest by creating uncertainty as
to the rights and liabilities of the war contractors.
Judge Pratt also examined the possible effects on state in-
terests should federal common law be applied. He concluded
that state law had yet to examine the question of a war contrac-
tor's liability to soldiers who had served abroad and were injured
by toxic chemicals manufactured and supplied by the contrac-
tors.16 State law dealing with isolated cases of injury to soldiers
caused by manufacturing defects in combat equipment was of
marginal relevance. The issues in these idiosyncratic cases were
far different from the question of liability to an entire army for
toxic exposure to a herbicide. Moreover, Judge Pratt noted that
the Agent Orange litigation, unlike the cases decided under
state law, involved toxic chemicals, the use of which is subject to
increased federal legislation and regulation. 7 Since state law
had yet to speak to the issue, the application of federal common
law could hardly impair any existing state interests.
The Second Circuit, in reversing Judge Pratt's decision to
apply federal common law, focused primarily on the first of the
three factors: whether there was a "substantial federal interest
in the outcome of the litigation."18 It found no "identifiable fed-
eral policy at stake" in the litigation sufficient to warrant the
application of federal common law."" In reaching this conclusion,
the court first addressed the question of whether there was a
federal interest in uniformity for its own sake. It decided that no
such federal interest existed when the suit was between private
litigants and did not involve the federal government as a party20
The court found it "of no moment" that the application of dif-
ferent state laws would produce "a variety of results. ' ' The
court thus concluded that "[i]t is in the nature of a federal sys-
tem that different states will apply different rules of law, based
on their individual perceptions of what is in the best interests of
I' Id.
18 Id. at 748-49.
17 Id. at 749.
,8 Agent Orange, 635 F.2d at 993.
19 Id.
2 "Id.




Those initiated into the conflicts of law fraternity will recog-
nize the Second Circuit's familiar refrain. Whenever a serious
challenge is made to shockingly unequal results brought about
by the application of one of the myriad choice of law theories, a
court will bristle with impatience and declare that unequal
treatment of parties before the court is merely the price of fed-
eralism. 23 Usually that completes the equal protection analysis.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit had to believe that traditional
choice of law methodology could respond intelligently to the
problem of the selection of a rule of law to govern this case. The
plaintiffs, however, argued that no choice of law system could
rationally do so. If a choice of law rule in a case imbued with
such overwhelming federal presence cannot effectively further
state interests, then the least we can ask is that it not foster
gross inequality. Sadly, the Second Circuit did nothing more
than parrot the "cost of federalism" theme. It did not inform the
lower court how it was to utilize the existing choice of law sys-
tem to select governing law. Moreover, while it recognized that
disparate results would almost certainly attend the decision, it
failed to explain how the lower court could arrive at the dispa-
rate results rationally.
In rejecting the application of federal common law, not only
did the Second Circuit adopt the traditional cavalier approach
of the courts to the problem of inequality, it also borrowed heav-
ily from the most extreme statements of interest analysis to give
content to its "dual interest" theory. The court distinguished
Agent Orange from such leading cases as Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,24 which mandated the application of federal
common law. It noted that federal common law had been ap-
plied when "the government's substantive interest in the litiga-
tion" was "monothetic." 5 In contrast, Agent Orange involved
two government interests "in sharp contrast with one another. 2 0
In Clearfield Trust the government's single substantive interest
was in preserving the federal fisc, whereas in Agent Orange the
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (1972).
21 318 U.S. 363 (1943).




government had an interest in the welfare of its veterans and an
opposing interest in protecting its suppliers of war material.
Judge Kearse's analysis appears to be too simplistic, unless
one is to believe that federal courts fashion federal common law
rules solely by taking into account the interest of the federal
government in emerging victorious from the litigation. Whatever
rule the court ultimately formulates must be sensitive not only
to the interests of the federal government but to the interests of
the opposing party as well. In Clearfield Trust the court permit-
ted the United States to recover from a bank that had honored a
forged endorsement because it found that the delay in bringing
the forged endorsement to the attention of the bank had not
prejudiced the bank.27 To characterize the rule formulated by
the court in Clearfield Trust as "monothetic" because it pro-
tected the federal fisc is downright silly. The rule selected by the
court fairly balanced the interests of the federal government and
the interests of the bank. One is hard pressed to think of a case
in which that kind of balancing is not present. The Second Cir-
cuit should not have been troubled by the need to balance the
government's interests in the welfare of its veterans and in the
welfare of its defense contractors in fashioning a rule of decision
in Agent Orange.28
It is not certain why Judge Kearse had such difficulty with
this issue. I would venture a guess, however, that the Second
Circuit suffered from the same malady affecting courts that at-
tempt to utilize interest analysis29 to resolve choice of law cases.
As Professor Ely has demonstrated, a major premise of interest
analysis is that states have a greater stake in advancing the in-
terests of their own citizens or domiciliaries than they have in
advancing the interests of outsiders.30 If that premise were shorn
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 370.
8 See Note, Tort Remedies For Servicemen Injured by Military Equipment: A
Case for Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 601, 623 (1980).
29 Courts employing an interest analysis approach examine the policie3 underlying
the laws in conflict and identify the parties' contacts with the respective jurisdictions to
determine which states have an interest in having their law applied in the particular
case. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Dlma
L.J. 171.
20 Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wrn. &
Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981). But see, Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in
the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the New Critics, 34 MEaca L REv. 593 (1983).
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from interest analysis there would be no false conflict cases."
And without false conflict cases the most significant contribution
of the modern school of conflicts scholars for resolving choice of
law problems would be obviated. It is clear that when a court
can find no interest in protecting its own, interest analysis pro-
vides little direction in helping to avoid resolve a conflict.32
There is, I believe, a common sense reason that explains
courts' need to rely on a "domiciliary protecting" principle in
choice of law. The same reason may explain why the Second Cir-
cuit believed that it could not resolve the federal common law
question when two opposing federal interests were at war with
each other. Cases that require courts to choose between two dif-
ferent sources of law in a federal system are excruciatingly diffi-
cult to decide. The problem is reminiscent of the quandary of
the judge who would like to find for both sides. To approach a
choice of law decision without a clear set of biases that embody
a philsophical perspective is almost certain to doom the venture
to failure. It is for this reason that the first Restatement of Con-
flicts had such a tenacious hold on American conflicts law for so
many years. It was not neutral; it approached most cases with a
clear territorial bias. The Currie brand of interest analysis
sought to define state interests in a more fair and even-handed
fashion. Therein lies the problem: the more sensitive and analyt-
ical the evaluation of competing state interests is, the more diffi-
cult it becomes to resolve the conflict. Ultimately, resolution de-
pends on some bias or philosophical position that will help
resolve the tension. The "domiciliary protection" thesis provides
an answer.3 3 A state, under this analysis has an obligation to
utilize its law to win victories for its domiciliaries.
It is likely that courts have faced a similar dilemma in seek-
ing to decide when federal common law is applicable and what
its content should be. The tension between the competing claims
3, Ely, supra note 30, at 180. A false conflict exists when only one state actually has
an interest in applying its own law. If advancing the interests of a state's own domiciliar-
ies is no longer a criterion, then the state that emerged victorious under interest analysis
because its law protected its own would be on a par with a state that was not protecting
its own. Id. at 179-S0.
31 See, e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973). (Washington's de-
fendant-protecting law immaterial to case involving only Oregan defendants; therefore,
applying Oregon law does not offend Washington's interest).
33 See Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses, 61 Ky. L.J. 393, 399 (1973).
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of the state and federal systems is substantial. When a court be-
comes convinced that a federal solution is absolutely necessary
(for whatever reason), it can look to the federal character of the
right to give content to the rule that is chosen. Admittedly, in
deciding whether to protect the federal fisc in Clearfield Trust,
the court had to deal fairly with banks. But in deciding the con-
tent of the federal rule that was to be chosen there was a clear
philosophical bias. The rule chosen was the one that would best
protect the federal fisc while not treating the banks unfairly. It
remains unresolved, however, what will happen to those cases
for which the federal focus provides no direction. Indeed, what
happens when the federal perspective demonstrates an internal
tension as great as the tension between the state and federal sys-
tems what guidelines is the court to utilize for decision making?
These questions, I believe, forced the Second Circuit to deny ju-
risdiction based on federal common law. Agent Orange did not
simply pit the state system against the federal system. The fed-
eral system was at war with itself. The federal bias could not, in
and of itself, tip the scales. If the federal bias could not resolve
the tension, there was no reason for not permitting the state-
federal tension to rend the case at the seams.
I believe that the Second Circuit was wrong. Even giving it
the benefit of the aforestated analysis, the fact remains that
Agent Orange was remanded to be tried under Erie-Klaxonr
when it should have been clear that no existing choice of law
system could resolve the case. A grocery store may find itself
temporarily out of sugar or some other staple; a clothing store
may be out of shirts or scarves; but a court of law cannot be "out
I Simply stated, the Erie-Klaxon doctrine mandates that a federal court sitting in
diversity must apply substantive state law as the rule of decision in the case. Erie R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). To determine which state's law will apply, the federal
court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Sten-
tar Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). When a case has originated in many jurisdictions
but is transferred to a federal court in one jurisdiction, the court must examine the con.
flicts-of-law rules of the states in which the transferor courts sit. Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964). In Agent Orange, individual claims were filed in all parts of the
country, but were transferred to the Eastern District of New York and certified as a cass
action. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 692. Therefore, once the Second Circuit refused to
permit federal common law to govern the case, the district court was forced to examine
the choice-of-law rules of each transferor state "to predict what law each state would
apply." Id. at 693. Judge Weinstein concluded that "under the special circumstances of
this litigation, all the transferor states would look to the same substantive law for the
rule of decision on the critical substantive issuer," Id.
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of law". By sending the case back to the district court under
Erie-Klaxon without any idea as to how the choice of law ques-
tions were to be resolved, the Second Circuit in effect invited the
trial judge to create and innovate-and that was exactly what
Judge Weinstein did.
II. RATIONALITY, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICIABILITY
Judge Weinstein found that no choice of law system pres-
ently utilized by any of the states was capable of resolving the
potential conflicts in Agent Orange. His decision speaks for it-
self and it is not my intent to parse it line by line. It is neces-
sary, however, to set forth his recitation of the relationships of
the parties and their contacts with various jurisdictions so that
one can appreciate how wide-ranging and diversified they were.
Judge Weinstein noted that in Agent Orange:
Injuries arguably occurred in the fifty states and other nations where
plaintiffs now live or at one time lived. The original exposure to Agent
Orange was at a variety of places in and near Vietnam-i.e., South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The conduct causing the injury was the
manufacture of Agent Orange by the defendants and the alleged fail-
ure by the defendants to warn the government of the dangers of Agent
Orange. Agent Orange was manufactured in factories in New Jersey,
Michigan, Arkansas, West Virginia, Missouri and Canada, and per-
haps Germany and elsewhere. The basic decision to use it was made
in and around Washington D.C. and in South Vietnam by our govern-
ment officials and those of South Vietnam. The companies responsible
for its manufacture are incorporated and have as their main place of
business the states of Delaware, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Kansas and Connecticut; treated as a unit, their combined sales
run into the billions of dollars and have a substantial impact in every
state of the union and in many foreign countries. It is difficult to
pinpoint any particular states as the location of the failure to warn
since what is alleged is inaction, not action. However, the meetings
and conferences which plaintiffs allege furthered what they refer to as
the "conspiracy of silence" took place in the various states where de-
fendants have their principal place of business. Other states with rele-
vant contacts include Pennsylvania and Texas, where the Herbicide
Management Team of the United States armed forces was located, Al-
abama and Mississippi, the states from where the Agent Orange was
shipped, and South Vietnam, where it was stored and used. Adding to
the factual complexity is that of mixture. The products manufactured
were so mixed and so labeled that it is not possible to determine
[Vol. 52:341
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which manufacturer's product was used at any time or place."
Even with the multiplicity of contacts, the question arises
- why could not each domiciliary state (either pre- or post
transaction) claim an interest in applying its law to its domicil-
iaries? If the sole question were the rationality of applying its
law to each individual claimant, it is likely that each state could
make out a case for applying its law under interest analysis.sa
The problem arises when the entire galaxy of state interests is
reveated. Once the competing claims of interested states are
presented there is no rational method for choosing among them.
The large number of states that would have a substantial claim
to application of their laws would overwhelm the interest of any
particular state in applying its own law. When one adds to this
the fact that the soldiers and the defense contractors were acting
in response to instructions from the federal government, the in-
terests of the other states are implicated not only as individual
states but also as members of a community of states. The inter-
ests of the individual state and the individual litigant are simply
dwarfed.3 7
If the Second Circuit was correct, we cannot establish the
content of a federal common law because of the absence of a
mechanism for establishing a national interest. I am aware that
Judge Weinstein argued that the Second Circuit only found
against federal question jurisdiction and not against the creation
I Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 700-01.
38 It is unlikely that such a finding would violate the guidelines of Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hauge, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). In Allstate, the Supreme Court held that a state may
constitutionally apply its own law to a case as long as that state has "significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 313. For a many facted exploration
of Allstate see Choice of Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hauge, 10 HozsTRA
L. REv. 1 (1981).
" In recent years there has been an attempt to formulate special choice of law rules
to deal with product liability conflicts. They are set forth in Symposium on Interest
Analysis in Conflict of Laws: An Inquiry Into Fundamentals With a Side Glance at Prod-
ucts Liability, 46 Omo ST. L. J. 590-93 (1985). An in depth evaluation of various propos-
als is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that none of the proposals comes
to grips with the serious inequality problem raised by Agent Orange and other mass
torts. Furthermore, many of the proposals admit to a substantive plaintiff bins. See eg.
Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and the Use of that
Analysis in Product Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 493, 504 (1985). Given the very
substantial legislative response to the product liability crisis there is a very real question
whether a plaintiff-bias reflects shared multijuridictional attitutes toward compensation.
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of a national common law by states utilizing state choice of law
rules.3 8 Nonetheless, if the court refused to exercise jurisdiction
because it could not determine the content of federal common
law, then there is good reason to question the authority of the
district court to do so by a more circuitous method. In terms of
alternatives, Judge Weinstein played with the idea of using fo-
rum law. Certainly under the Currie analysis forum law should
not be displaced unless the law of another forum has a superior
claim to application. Judge Weinstein argued that the national
interest had a stronger claim to application than that of any par-
ticular forum. I believe that the argument begs the question. If
the Second Circuit was not prepared to identify such am interest,
how could the district court do so? I am convinced that the ne-
cessity of seeking out such a national solution rather than apply-
ing the forum law stems from the gross inequality that would
have resulted had forum law been applied. If, in fact, forum law
was used as a failback to decide individual cases before the court
it would not resolve the inequality problem. 9 Only the most
compelling state interests should permit a court to become the
tool for fostering grossly unequal results. Forum law may be a
tool for deciding a case for which no other resolution is possible,
but it does not justify the application of different rules of law to
large numbers of litigants. It is at this juncture that minimum
rationality loses out to gross inequality. It was for this reason
that Judge Weinstein was forced to create a national standard.
Finally, Judge Weinstein had to concern himself with the
very real problem of whether Agent Orange could be tried under
a multiplicity of rules of law. The Second Circuit in In re Dia-
mond Shamrock Chemical Company, expressed "considerable
skepticism" as to the existence of a national consensus rule and
suggested that variations in state law could be handled by sub-
classing.40 I believe that the Second Circuit was indulging in
'" Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 697. Judge Weinstein explained that although fed-
eral common law does not control the case by its own force, states often adopt federal
statutes and common law when fashioning their own laws. Id. at 695. Tho Second Cir-
cuit's decision forbade the use of federal common law as a basis for jurisdiction but did
not preclude the application of federal law or a national consensus approach if state
courts chose to look to these as the rules of decision in their cases. Id. at 698.
31 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965(1985), the Court held that
forum law could not be applied in a class action when it was clear that the forum had no
"interest in claims correlated to that state." Id. at 2980.
1o In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.); (subclasses of
[Vol. 62:341
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wishful thinking. The number of potential conflicts in Agent Or-
ange would have turned it into a procedural nightmare. At some
point a court must ask whether fidelity to the nuances of state
law should overwhelm the practical problems attending the liti-
gation of a lawsuit. When one considers the justiciability ques-
tion in the context of the flimsy claim of any single state to the
application of its law over the law of any other state, the deci-
sion in favor of a single national standard becomes even more
compelling.
I conclude that the choice of a national consensus rule of
law to govern Agent Orange was correct. As Judge Weinstein in-
dicated in his opinion, the adoption of a multistate substantive
conflicts rule had been widely discussed in the literature . 1 The
most significant obstacle to its implementation has been the
high administrative cost that would attend the formulation of
such rules in individual cases. In the context of a class action in
which tens of thousands of claims are implicated, this concern is
of no moment. To test whether such a standard could be formu-
lated, I have chosen to examine how it would operate in the con-
text of the defendant identification issue.
I. FORGING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS STANDARD - AGENT OR-
ANGE AND DEFENDANT IDENTIFICATION
The Agent Orange litigation raised the dual problem of the
indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant. Plain-
tiffs had to attempt to prove that a particular plaintiff had suf-
fered harm from exposure to Agent Orange. Even assuming that
plaintiffs could establish that the entire soldier population faced
a higher statistical likelihood of contracting the various diseases
that Agent Orange was alleged to have caused, there was a very
real problem of identifying any particular plaintiff as having
contracted a disease as a result of the Agent Orange exposure
and not from some other source.' 2 In addition, it was clear that
plaintiffs according to variation of state law acceptable solution under unique factors of
this case),cert. denied 465 U.S.1067,(1984).
41 Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 693 (citing Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A
Critique, 83 CoLuIt. L Rnv. 772, 971 (1983); Trautman, The Relation Between American
Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAw mD Com'sP.Pftoa. 105, 120 (1977)).
42 Even those who are sharply critical of applying a "substantive super law" have
recognized that in a case like Agent Orange with relevant contacts so dispersed that no
single law can be plausibly chosen that the creation of a multi-state substantive law may
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plaintiffs would have difficulty in identifying which of the seven
Agent Orange defendants caused the harm to any particular
plaintiff. The herbicide was shipped to depots in Alabama and
Mississippi by the seven defendants with no identification other
than an orange stripe on the outside of the barrel. Barrels were
then forwarded to Vietnam with no additional markings. The di-
oxin content of the batches varied from defendant to defendant,
and the contents of the barrels were often mixed with other de-
fendants' barrels and sprayed in mixed form from the same air-
plane. Furthermore, as a result of repeated sprayings, the envi-
ronment contained the combined product of any number of
defendants' Agent Orange. The military treated all Agent Or-
ange as fungible and never sought to identify zones in which the
products of any one defendant were to be used exclusively.
Thus, one-on-one causation between a particular defendant's
product and a particular veteran's injury could not be
established.
Authority throughout the country is sharply split as to the
correct method for resolving the problems of the indeterminate
defendant. Plaintiffs therefore presented a broad range of theo-
ries, some of them novel, to meet the demands of the law with
regard to establishing causation and defendant identification.
The defendants vigorously contested the application of the caus-
tion theories to the unique facts of Agent Orange. It is clear that
the adoption of some of them would have created serious choice
of law problems. Whether some of the more novel defendant
identification theories presented by plaintiffs and adopted by
the court would raise conflict of law problems is hard to deter-
mine. After setting forth the various alternatives, I shall ex-
amine whether there is any hope that these diverse strains point
to a credible national consensus standard.
be necessary. See, e.g. Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics - And Incidentally
What Should Be Done About Choice of Law For Products Liability?, 46 OHio ST. L, J.
569, 572 (1985). Recent literature has focused on this problem. See, e.g., Delgado, Be-
yond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules For Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALmF.
L. Rav. 881 (1982); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984). See also
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 428 (D. Utah 1984) (although plaintiffs' injuries
may have been caused by other sources, statistical evidence may prove that defendant's




In the seminal case of Summers v. Tice,43 two hunters negli-
gently fired their guns in the direction of the plaintiff at the
same time. It was impossible to ascertain which of the defend-
ants fired the shot that injured the plaintiff. The California
court held that under these circumstances the defendants were
jointly and severally liable unless they could absolve themselves
of liability individually. Justice Traynor characterized the Sum-
mers burden-shifting rule as being
based on the policy that it is preferable to hold liable a negligent de-
fendant who did not in fact cause the injury than to deny an innocent
plaintiff any remedy when it cannot be determined which of the de-
fendants is responsible for the harm but it appears that one of them
was.4"
It was the contention of plaintiffs that the Agent Orange
facts made out an a fortiori case for the application of the Sum-
mers burden-shifting principle. In Summers, one defendant
whose bullet missed was nevertheless held liable because he was
unable to meet the burden of proving that his bullet did not hit
the plaintiff and that he was thus totally free from causal rela-
tion to the plaintiff's injuries. In contrast, each of the defend-
ants in Agent Orange is alleged to have been causally responsi-
ble for some indeterminate amount of harm to the plaintiff class.
This brings the case much closer to section 433(b)(2) of the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts, which provides:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks
to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of appor-
tionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is
upon each such actor.45
Admittedly, it cannot be established that any single plaintiff
suffered as a result of the combined fault of all of the defend-
ants. Nonetheless, defendants whose fault was causally related
to the injuries suffered by the class would walk away unscathed
even though both fault and cause had been established. The es-
43 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
4 Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d 674, 682-83 n.2, 321 P.2d 1, 7 n.2 (Traymor, J,
dissenting).
45 RESTATEIMET (SECOND) OF ToRS § 433(b)(2) (1965).
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cape hatch would be the inability to establish the causal relation
between any single defendant's product and the harm suffered
by any given plaintiff. This was the very evil that the Restate-
ment sought to avoid. In addition, unlike the defendants in
Summers, the defendants in Agent Orange were not strangers to
each other. Each of them knew that their products would be
commingled when sprayed. This brought Agent Orange closer in
concept to the pollution cases in which the independent tortious
conduct of several defendants produces a single indivisible
injury.46
The defendants took sharp issue with the application of al-
ternative liability to the Agent Orange fact pattern. They con-
tended that in deciding whether alternative liability is appropri-
ate in a product liability case, courts have focused on a number
of factors: (1) whether the cause of the harm complained of was
undisputed; (2) whether all of the possible tortfeasors were
before the court; and (3) whether the defendants were in a supe-
rior position to offer evidence of identification, or were responsi-
ble for plaintiff's inability to identify the manufacturer. 4 De-
fendants argued that at best the causal relationship between
dioxin and the injuries complained of wa8 tenuous. Therefore,
utilizing the extreme measure of shifting the burden of proof to
defendants when the injuries were based on such a thin causal
thread entailed a considerable extension of the Summers doc-
trine, in which only defendant identification and not causation
itself was in question. Defendants further argued that the appli-
cability of Summers was even more questionable because not all
of the causal agents that could be responsible for plaintiffs' inju-
ries were before the court as defendants. Defendants suggested
that many Agent Orange symptoms could have resulted from
munitions, antimalarial drugs, chlorinated insecticides, orga-
nophosphorous insecticides, illicit drugs, microorganism diseases
endemic to Southeast Asia, and psyschological problems arising
from exposure to the war theatre.4" Finally, defendants argued
" Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
997 (1974); Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731
(1952).
'7 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 827. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004, 1016-17 (D.S.C. 1981).
4" Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 827; cf. Starling v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co.,
533 F. Supp. 183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (injuries caused by asbestos expo.ure not limited
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that they were in no better position than plaintiffs to identify
the true causal agents, since they were excluded from the mili-
tary's decisions of where, when and how to spray Agent Orange.
More telling than these arguments is the fact that most
courts that have examined alternative liability in the context of
a complex product liability case have rejected its use as a bur-
den-shifting device. Thus, most courts that have ruled on the
DES and asbestos cases, for example, have generally refused to
apply alternative liability.49
One must conclude that, although the alternative liability
theory had much to commend it, there was good reason to doubt
whether the trial court would have adopted it. Even if it had
been adopted, there was a real question whether the Second Cir-
cut would have approved its application to Agent Orange.00
to asbestos products; other products may have caused injuries).
49 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 533 F. Supp.
593 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (SD. Ga.
1982); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981). Only the Michigan Su-
preme Court in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 123 (1984), has applied the alternative liability theory to a DES case. See also
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (burden of proof shifted to defendants in
case where tip of forceps broke off during surgery and was left in plaintiff's spine), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d
1305 (Law Div. 1980) (lower court adopting alternative liability theory in DES case). In
Hall v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court
recognized alternative liability as a burden-shifting device but quite clearly limited its
application to breaches of duty that are "substantially concurrent in time and of a simi-
lar nature." Id. at 380. Since the various failure to warn duties in Agent Orange spanned
a significant period of time and reflected different states of knowledge among the various
defendants whose products contained differing amounts of dioxin, there is considerable
doubt as to the applicability of this limited alternative liability approach to Agent
Orange.
rO 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1930).
The Sindell opinion has received a mixed reception from courts and scholars. Several
courts have directly adopted Sindell or some variation thereof. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984) (court
applied risk contribution theory in which market share was one of a number of factors
used to assign percentage of fault among defendants); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564
F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353,
rev'd, 681 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Note, Market Share Liability: A New
Method of Recovery for DES Litigants, 30 CATm U.L. Rnv. 551 (1931). Note, Market
Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. Rnv. C68 (1931).
A substantial number of courts however, have, rejected the market share approach
even in the DES cases. See, e.g. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1931)
(market share approach held to be against public policy of South Carolina); Mizell v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981); Morton v. Abbott Laboratorie, 538 F. Supp.
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B. Market Share Liability
Another approach to the problem of defendant identifica-
tion is that offered by the California Supreme Court in Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories.1 The Sindell court was faced with DES
plaintiffs who could not identify the specific manufacturer of the
DES pills taken by their mothers that caused the vaginal can-
cers from which plaintiffs suffered. The court held that if the
companies comprising a substantial share of the DES market
were joined as defendants, then each defendant would be liable
to pay its own market share unless it could establish that its
pills were not the cause of the particular plaintiff's injuries. In
light of the fact that almost all (if not all) of the companies in
the Agent Orange market were named as defendants, the Agent
Orange plaintiffs proposed the application of "market share" li-
ability as a way to resolve the defendant identification problem.
Presumably no defendant would be able to establish that its
product was not the cause of a particular plaintiff's injuries and
would thus be unable to excuplate itself from liability on a case-
by-case basis.
The appropriateness of the market share theory to Agent
Orange, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there is a
sharp split in authority as to whether "market share" is an ac-
ceptable method for the resolution of the defendant identifica-
tion problem. Second, there are special problems in applying
market share to Agent Orange.
Although the market share theory has been found accept-
593 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332 (D.D.C. 1982); Payton v.
Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). It has similarly been rejected
by the majority of courts that have considered it in asbestos cases on both policy and
factual grounds. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Hannon v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90
(E.D. La. 1983); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga.
1982); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Prelick v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 79-2206, (D. Md. Dec. 11, 1981); Garcia v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 1981 Ash. Lit. Rep. 3931 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 1981); Aguilar v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 1981 Asb. Lit. Rep. 4141 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 1981). It should
be noted that in several of the asbestos cases market share was held to be unnecessary
since the plaintiffs were able to identify specific defendants. See, e.g., In re Related As-
bestos Cases, 543 F. Supp.1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Scholarly writings have been sharply
critical as well. See, e.g. Fischer, Products Liability - An Analysis of Market Share Lia-
bility, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in D.E.S. Cases -
Sindell, 14 IND. L. REv. 695 (1981).
1 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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able in the DES cases, there is a general hostility towards its use
in the asbestos cases based on the fact that asbestos products,
unlike DES, are not generic products. As one court noted "as-
bestos fibers are of several varieties, each used in varying quan-
tities by defendants in their products, and each differing in its
harmful effects. 52 Agent Orange approximates the asbestos
cases since there is general agreement that the dioxin content of
the Agent Orange differed from manufacturer to manufacturer.
It might have been possible to fashion a formula based on
gallons sold and dioxin content so that a form of dioxin share of
the market could be derived.53 In light of the doubt expressed
with regard to the accuracy of Sindell's market share apportion-
ment approach, it is questionable whether courts would be will-
ing to add a new complicating factor that would move signifi-
cantly beyond Sindell.
C. Concerted Action
A significant aspect of plaintiffs' attempt to overcome the
problem of defendant identification was their argument that the
defendants conspired together to keep the government ignorant
of the dangers of dioxin. Where a true conspiracy exists, either
through express agreement or through tacit understanding, there
is no need to establish a separate causal connection between
each of the co-conspirators and the plaintiff's injuries; the acts
of one are the acts of all.54
Plaintiffs built their conspiracy argument on a series of doc-
uments arising from meetings arranged by Dow Chemical Com-
pany to deal with the "dioxin" problem. For example, on March
19, 1965, Dow wrote letters to the Hooker, Diamond and Hercu-
les Chemical Companies, inviting them to come to Midland to
discuss the toxicological problems caused by the toxic impurities
in dioxin. In a subsequent memorandum dated July 9, 1965, the
chief toxicologist at Hercules wrote concerning his telephone
conversation with a Dow executive:
He then stated that Dow was extremely frightened that this situation
12 In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
There was speculation that the defendants apportioned damage3 among them-
selves on this basis.
W. PRossER & W. KEETON, THE LAw oF ToS § 46 (5th ed. 1984); Bierczynsld v.
Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Nelson v. Nason, 343 hMss. 220, 177 N.E.2d 857 (1961).
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might explode. They are aware their competitors are marketing 2,4,5-
T [dioxin] which contains alarming amounts of acnegen and if the
government learns of this, the whole industry will suffer. They are
particularly fearful of a Congressional investigation and excessive re-
strictive legislation on manufacture of pesticides which might result.'5
It was the plaintiffs' position that Dow feared that disclos-
ure to the Government that the herbicides it purchased were
contaminated by dioxin would cause retaliatory action that
would hurt Dow's plans to capitalize on its dominant and profit-
able position in the military and domestic herbicide market.
Plaintiffs further argued that evidence collected from 1965-1970
supported the theory that a tacit agreement existed on the part
of all manufacturers of Agent Orange to withhold information
from the government concerning the production, testing and
health hazards associated with the use of Agent Orange.
Defendants vigorously disputed the existence of any con-
spiracy. As evidence of separate rather than conspiratorial be-
havior they pointed to the fact that each defendant had its own
process for manufacturing Agent Orange resulting in differing
levels of dioxin contamination. They noted that the meetings
which lay at the center of plaintiff's consPiracy argument were
nothing more than an invitation to all American producers of
the herbicide trichlorophenol to discuss toxicological problems
caused by the possible presence of highly toxic impurities in
trichlorophenol:
There is a plausible argument that even if the defendants
did not have a tacit understanding to withhold dioxin informa-
tion from the government, they followed parallel lines of behav-
ior that kept the government ignorant of important information.
Significantly, such parallel behavior was not held sufficient to
support a civil conspiracy in the DES cases.56
" Plaintiffs' Concerted Action Memorandum, Exhibit 8.
" See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
The only DES case to find liability on the basis of "conscious parallel conduct" was
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
However, Bichler is slim authority to support the proposition that a conspiracy may be
established by conscious parallel behavior. In Bichler, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that the defendants failed to object to a jury instruction that based liability for
conspiracy on "conscious parallel conduct." Id. at 583, 436 N.E.2d at 187, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 781. It thus limited its role on appeal to deciding whether the evidence supported a




The fountainhead for the concept of enterprise liability is
Hall v. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 57 In that case, thirteen chil-
dren sued six blasting cap manufacturers, alleging that they had
been injured by the explosion of the caps in twelve unrelated
accidents between 1955 and 1959.8 Although the six defendants
were not the only possible sources of blasting caps, they did
comprise virtually the entire blasting cap industry in the United
States. Plaintiffs claimed that the practices of the industry were
deficient because they failed to take reasonable safety precau-
tions and failed to provide adequate warnings. They alleged that
members of the industry had adhered to industry-wide safety
standards and had delegated substantial safety investigation and
design functions to their trade association. The court found
that plaintiffs who were unable to establish defendant identifica-
tion could shift the burden to defendants to disprove their
causal connection, provided that plaintiffs "demonstrate defend-
ants .. .joint awareness of the risks at issue in this case and
their joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks."'0
In some ways the Agent Orange defendants may be likened
to the defendants in Hall. The seven Agent Orange defendants
made up the entirety of the phenoxy herbicide manufacturers in
the United States. Plaintiffs argued that defendants met and
found common ground to help control what was feared as poten-
tially intrusive government regulation of their industry. They
banded together to form the Industry Task Force on Phenoxy
Herbicides under the auspices of the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association for the purpose of determining toxic tol-
erances of phenoxy herbicides. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
defendants utilized their very substantial control of information
and research to keep numerous government agencies in the dark
as to the reality of the dioxin contamination of the phenoxy
herbicides.
Though there are similarities to Hall, the differences are
significant. No industry-wide standard for acceptable dioxin
as a matter of law parallel conduct would suffice to establish a civil conspiracy. Id.
" 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 359.




contamination of the phenoxy herbicides was ever developed.
This fact supports the position that this was not an industry
seeking joint control of risks. Defendants' meetings may have
led to less information flowing to the government, but they did
not lead to a uniform industry standard. Defendants argued
with considerable justification that the flow of information to
the government was substantial and came from various sources
within the industry. They pointed to a large body of published
literature that contained significant data concerning dioxin.0 1 In
short, defendants argued that theirs was a competitive industry
acting in diverse ways rather than an industry exercising cen-
tralized control of its risks. The enterprise theory would there-
fore have been a difficult one to sustain.
E. Failure to Warn About the Dangers Attendant to Commin-
gling Its Product with Those of Other Chemical Company
Defendants.
As was noted earlier, defendants contended that the govern-
ment indiscriminately mixed and used the various Agent Orange
formulae manufactured by the respective defendants. The prob-
lem of defendant identification was thus laid at the doorstep of
the military. Plaintiffs argued that the very opposite was true:
each defendant failed to warn the government about the dangers
attached to improper use of its own product. In plaintiffs' view,
the onus of identification was on the defendant chemical compa-
nies and not on the government.
The facts of this case brought together very closely related
failure to warn duties. The first was that each defendant failed
to warn about the dioxin content in its own product. This arose
from a duty to warn that a product contaminated with any level
of dioxin was unsafe. Since the military had no knowledge of the
danger level of any of the products, it had no reason not to mix
and use the defendants' product or to be concerned about the
effects of commingling. The duty to warn also arose from the
risk of bio-accumulation of the defendants' dioxin both in the
environment and in the body tissues of each plaintiff. Plaintiffs
61 A summary review of the information that came to the government's attention
can be found in Judge Pratt's decision on the defendant's motion for summary judgment
based on the government contract defense. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565
F. Supp. 1263, 1266-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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argued that the continued presence of dioxin in the environment
and in body tissues served as a constant exposure not unlike a
constant source of radiation implanted in the body.
In order to place this argument in perspective, consider the
position of the defendants who contended that their products
were relatively "clean." It was the plaintiffs' contention that a
manufacturer who knew that its product was to be used and
mixed with products of greater contamination had a duty to
warn against such contamination. Thus, any defendant who
knew that its product was to be mixed with products of other
defendants that contained significantly higher dioxin levels and
knew that such mixing would contaminate its product had a
duty to warn of the dangers attendant to such mixing. This duty
to warn is especially significant in view of plaintiffs' allegation
that the defendants knew of the contamination of the Agent Or-
ange shipped to Vietnam by the various manufacturers, and fur-
ther knew that the government did not know of such contamina-
tion. The mixing of products then became a foreseeable use.
Thus, there is no problem of defendant identification; each de-
fendant could be considered the cause of more dangerous and
greater volumes of contaminated Agent Orange being sprayed by
virtue of each defendant's failure to warn. 2
The manufacturers of the heavily contaminated Agent Or-
ange had a similar duty to warn of mixing their products with
Agent Orange that was less contaminated. Mixing the more and
less contaminated batches of the herbicide necessarily results in
a larger volume of Agent Orange with more gross dioxin in the
mix. Since all defendants had some dioxin in their Agent Or-
ange, the manufacturers of the more highly contaminated herbi-
cide had a duty to warn that using their highly contaminated
product with other lesser contaminated products would make
the others more dangerous.
There was yet another dimension to this argument based on
classic failure to warn decisions. Not only was the commingling
of the Agent Orange in question in this case, but the cumulative
62 That a defendant is required to warn of dangers attendant to a forseeable use or
even a forseeable misuse of its product is supported by a plethora of cases in literally
every jurisdiction. See, e.g., Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457, 404 A.2d 1M4
(N.H. 1979); Tingey v. E.F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 8907 (1947); RE-
STATEMEr (SEcoND) OF ToRmS § 388-389 (1979).
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effect of the various dose levels of the Agent Orange that were
sprayed in Vietnam were at issue as well. If the defendants knew
that their dose levels differed drastically, they had a duty to
warn about the inappropriateness of use in an environment
where such varying dose levels existed. 3
For all the ingenuity of this argument, the reality is that it
is predicated on a duty to reveal to the government information
concerning the Agent Orange manufactured by other defend-
ants. Defendants argued with some justification that there exists
no common-law duty to inform a purchaser about the properties
of a competitor's product; this is similar to the case of the good
samaritan or the rescuer for which the law has not recognized a
duty to come to the aid of another."
F. Defendants Who Were Aware of Industry-Wide Problems
with the Contanimination of Agent Orange Had an Inde-
pendent Duty to Inform the Government of the
Contamination
The preceding section outlined a duty to warn the military
of the substantial dioxin contamination problem facing the in-
dustry as a result of the various processes used to manufacture
the herbicides. In addition, the plaintiffs took the position that
once the defendants became aware of the problems that existed
with regard to the manufacture of dioxin-contaminated Agent
Orange, they had a duty to warn the government not only about
their own product, but also about the problems that arose
throughout the industry. According to the plaintiffs this would
be necessary even if a defendant could establish that its own
product was dioxin free. Plaintiffs argued that Agent Orange
was not the classic case of a stranger who refuses to come for-
ward and rescue another. In this case, long standing relation-
ships in which the parties have come to trust each other's judg-
ment may have been a predicate for the imposition of an
affirmative duty to act.6 5
See, e.g., Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 15 Ariz. App. 166, 487 P.2d 12 (1971);
Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
64 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §56 (5th ed. 1984); Carrier v.
Riddell Inc., 721 F.2d 867 (Ist Cir. 1983); Osterland v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301
(1928).
15 See, e.g., W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
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The plaintiffs argued that the following facts suggested that
the government had a right to expect the defendants to come
forward with information concerning the products of other com-
panies that defendants knew to be seriously contaminated with
dioxin:
1) The special expertise of several defendants with regard to testing
for dioxin. This technique was available to the defendants and not to
the government. 2) The knowledge to substantial certainty that the
products of the others would be intermingled and sprayed as if they
were fungible. The defendants knew that the products were different
in that they contained varying amounts of dioxin. The government
did not know and treated all the Agent Orange as fungible. 3) The
unprecedented exposure of hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the
dioxin hazard. This was the largest spraying of herbicides in the his-
tory of mankind. 4) The "take charge" attitude of Dow and other de-
fendants with regard to the information that was to be disseminated
and the attempt to jealously guard it from public view.'
The implication for the causation issue is obvious. By hy-
pothesis, the breach of the duty to inform the government was
specifically directed to the highly toxic product of all co-defend-
ants. The very product that caused the harm was allowed to be
deployed because the defendants failed to warn not only of the
dangers indigenous to their own products but also of dangers in-
herent in the products the entire industry was selling.
The defendants' response to this argument followed their
responses as discussed earlier. They contended that no indepen-
dent duty to warn of industry-wide problems has ever been rec-
ognized short of conspiracy or enterprise liability.
Each of these defendant identification theories poses its
own choice-of-law problems. Plaintiff's various home states sub-
scribed to different theories. A federal court would have to de-
cide for each plaintiff whether his or her home state would apply
its law or defer to the law of another interested state under its
choice-of-law rules. The prospect of deciphering these conflicts
for the hundreds of parties in Agent Orange was overwhelming.
op ToRTs, 422-46 (6th ed. 1982). Relationships having far less moment than that between
the government and the chemical companies have been held to trigger a duty to act
affirmatively. See Connelly v. Kaufmann & Bear Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125
(1944)(store owner and customer); Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.
1947)(boat owner and social guest); Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N .Ed
553, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977)(police officer and drunken citizen).
" Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 709-10.
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G. What is a National Consensus and Where Can One Find
It?
Having briefly outlined the arguments that the plaintiffs
utilized to overcome their inability to identify the particular de-
fendant causing harm to a particular claimant, it is evident why
I am somewhat skeptical about the ability to forge a national
consensus standard. It is relatively clear that what Judge Wein-
stein meant by "national consensus" is a multistate substantive
rule that accommodates the interests of the conflicting states. 7
This is generally accomplished by forging a rule that reflects val-
ues that are common to all the states, but compromising among
the various rules that are in conflict. That is how I believe Pro-
fessor von Mehren defines a multistate substantive rule.05 In my
own writings I have presented a similar definition.69
If that is what Judge Weinstein had in mind, ] believe he
would find that the defendant identification issue would not
lend itself to the creation of a multistate substantive rule of law.
On this issue there is a fundamental difference of opinion as to
whether tort law should impose collective liability. It is fair to
say that the courts have been literally screaming at one another.
I do not believe that there is an artifice available to bridge the
gap. Even if one could argue that in the generic product case
there is likely to be ultimate agreement in the courts for some
form of burden shifting, one simply cannot predict with any con-
fidence that in a case involving a product that differs from de-
fendant to defendant (as in Agent Orange), courts would agree
that burden shifting should be undertaken.7 0
The only way out was to create a national rule, not based on
consensus or compromise, but rather on what the court believed
to be the preferable national solution to the problem of defend-
ant identification. In short, the only way to resolve the conflict
problems in this case was to create a federal common law. This
17 Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 690, 709, 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
68 von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REv. 347 (1974);
von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW AND CommrEp. PaoBs. 27
(1977).
69 Twerski & Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice-of-Law Problems - At
the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 781 (1979).
70 In Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985), the court rejected the
market share burden-shifting approach for non-generic products.
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the Second Circuit refused to do. Judge Weinstein sought to
dance around the problem by suggesting that a national consen-
sus could emerge. I believe that he too was wrong.
Judge Weinstein brilliantly demonstrated that classic choice
of law theory would not work in Agent Orange. But a multistate
substantive rule was equally unattainable. The only solution was
a national solution. There is evidence that courts are seriously
troubled over unequal treatment of litigants in mass tort litiga-
tion.7 ' The Agent Orange choice of law decision represents a
glimmer of hope that the courts may be coming to grips with the
pledge of allegiance; we may yet find ourselves to be "one nation
indivisible."
71 In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1955), for ex-
ample, the Fifth Circuit split sharply as to whether federal common law should be ap-
plied to resolve difficult issues in the asbestos case
1986]

